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CHIPPING AWAY AT LAWYER





Should the legal profession permit lawyers to lie when negotiating on behalf
of clients? The virtually unequivocal position of the profession and commentators
is "no," and such a position is generally followed by the American Bar Association
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules).' The Preamble to the
Model Rules states, "[a]s a negotiator a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the
client but consistent with the requirements of honest dealings with others."
2
Model Rule 8.4(c) declares that dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation
constitute professional misconduct, 3 and is based on a similar rule in the earlier
American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code).4
The Model Code also mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false
statement of law or fact.
5
When the American Bar Association (ABA)6 adopted the Model Rules in
1983, the Model Code provision was included. However, the Model Rules
language reads, "false statement of material law or fact" in Model Rule 3.3,
Candor Toward the Tribunal, 7 and in Model Rule 4.1, Truthfulness in Statements
* "Situation ethics holds that both moral and legal rules are only relatively obliging and valid.
Their claim upon us depends extrinsically upon variable circumstances." Fletcher, Situation Ethics,
Law and Watergate, 6 CUMB. L. REV. 35, 36 (1975).
* * Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; B.A., Smith College; J.D., Stetson
University; LL.M., Columbia University.
The author thanks R. Kent Greenawalt, Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law, in whose Seminar on Legal Philosophy this article received its genesis, and
Professors Michael Finch, Calvin Kuenzel, and Michael Swygert, Stetson University College of Law,
for their thoughtful critiques and encouragement.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT (1983, revised 1989) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
2. Id. at Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibility (emphasis supplied).
3. Id. at Model Rule 8.4(c).
4. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE].
5. Id. at DR 7-102(A)(5).
6. American Bar Association [hereinafter ABA].
7. MODEL RuLES, supra note 1, at Rule 3.3.
1
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to Others. 8 The narrowing of the veracity requirement in negotiations is clearly
set forth in the official Comment to Model Rule 4.1.9 (Comments are intended
as "guides to interpretation.") 10 The Comment declares, "A lawyer is required
to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but fgenerally has no
affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts." 1 The Comment
continues, "[w]hether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can
depend on the circumstance. Under generally accepted conventions in negotia-
tions certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material
fact." 12 The Comment then singles out three exceptions to the veracity re-
quirement for negotiators: (1) Estimates of price or value placed on the subject
of a transaction; (2) a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim;
and (3) the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of
8. Id. at Model Rule 4.1, Truthfulness in Statements to Others
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
COMMENT:
Misrepresentation:
A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but
generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A
misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another
person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act.
Statements of Fact:
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be
regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted
conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements
of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a
party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is
the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would
constitute fraud.
Fraud by Client:
Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain
information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. The
requirement of disclosure created by this paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations
created by Rule 1.6.
Id. at Model Rule 4.1 and Comment.
9. Id. at Model Rule 4.1 Comment.
10. Id. at Preamble: Scope.
11. Id. at Model Rule 4.1 Comment.
12. Id. (emphasis supplied).
2
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the principal would constitute fraud. 13 The reason for developing these three
particular items as exceptions is unclear and is certainly inconsistent with the
Preamble's honest dealings with others precept, 14 and Model Rule 8.4's
proscription against dishonesty, deceit and misrepresentation.
15
This Article questions the wisdom of the Model Rule's exceptions to honest
dealings in negotiations on several grounds: (1) Proponents of the exceptions
have not offered empirical evidence or professional justification for this
approach; 16 (2) The approach will further tarnish the profession's image;
(3) The approach will create a slippery slope that leads to unintended ethical
violations; and (4) The approach will erode the high degree of trust, veracity and
integrity required of lawyers as "officer[s] of the legal system."1 7  For these
reasons, the Model Rule's exceptions to honesty in negotiations should be
abolished by the ABA and by those states that have already adopted them,18 and
proposals in other states to amend ethics codes or to adopt new rules to create the
exceptions in negotiations should be defeated.
II. DISCUSSION
A fundamental precept of effective lawyering is assisting clients in realistical-
ly appraising their situation and evaluating the probability of achieving a desired
result. The lawyer's experience, objective viewpoint, and ability to weigh
competing alternatives assist clients in making decisions. Although clients make
the ultimate decisions regarding the objectives of representation, 19 clients are
entitled to the lawyer's honest assessments and straightforward advice.20  In
negotiating, lawyers serve as "go-betweens" for the client in dealing with other
13. Id.
14. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Professor Charles Wolfram notes:
The final version of the Model Rules consists of a confusing set of rigid but
contradictory commands, not all of the literal terms of which the same lawyer
could possibly obey. The tangled skein was produced by the process of
extensive floor amendment that significantly reshaped important parts of the
Model Rules in the February 1983 meeting of the ABA House of Delegates.
C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 723 (1986).
16. Id. "How or why the bar concluded that a negotiation morality that rewards dishonesty is
'generally accepted' is never stated. The conclusion is certainly not based on existing empirical
evidence .... Moreover, regardless of empirical verification, an ethics code should not condone
conduct merely because it is 'generally accepted.'" Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful
Bargaining by Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 411, 425-26 (1988).
17. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, at Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities.
18. Thirty states have adopted the Model Rules with modifications. Telephone interview with
Joan O'Shaughnessy, Staff Attorney for the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility (April 21,
1989).
19. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, at Model Rule 1.2(a).
20. d. at Model Rule 2.1 Comment.
1990]
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parties.2 1 By conducting themselves in a conscientious and forthright manner,
lawyers elevate the negotiation process to a higher plane. 22 Likewise, if lawyers
apply a lower standard of conduct during negotiations, the process is demeaned.
Devising enforceable standards of ethical behavior for the legal profession is
not an easy task.23 As commentators point out, if ethical norms are routinely
violated, this will weaken the force of the norms, thus making it more difficult for
the bar to follow, let alone enforce, its ethical rules.24 This difficulty, however,
should not dictate the rejection of "better and more desirable rules for poorer
ones., 25 Arguably, it would be preferable to have no rules, rather than poor
rules. 26 Since rules of ethics are normative and thereby shape expectations and
behavior, great care should be taken to ensure that the rules adopted are consonant
with the high level of trust and confidence that the public reposes in the practicing
bar. Consequently, rules allowing lawyers to engage in puffery, deception, and
lying are inappropriate and unacceptable because the public's trust and confidence
in lawyers will diminish. In addition, allowing such conduct is inconsistent with
a lawyer's obligation of integrity as an "officer of the legal system."
27
The original draft of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Discussion Draft) imposed an obligation of "fairness" in negotiations. 28
Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Reporter for the Kutak Commission 29 that
drafted the Model Rules, writes of the difficulty in drafting the "fairness"
21. "Negotiation is one of the most important activities of the practicing lawyer. It is the
dominant method of resolving civil and criminal disputes and is also important in a non-litigation or
transactional context such as in setting contract terms." Perschbacher, Regulating Lawyers'
Negotiations, 27 ARIZ. L. REv. 75-76 (1985). "Legal negotiators put together the millions of daily
transactions that keep social, economic, and legal structures functioning...." Menkel-Meadow, Legal
Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 905, 911 (1983).
22. See, e.g., R. FISHER AND W. URY, GETING TO YES (1981). "Principled negotiations
produces wise agreements amicably and efficiently." Id. at 86.
23. See, e.g., White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 938 (1980).
24. See, e.g., id. at 937.
25. Id. at 938.
26. Id. See also, e.g., Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 99 (1982).
"If we cannot enforce the rules, it may be advisable to eliminate them." Id. at 125. Cf. Lowenthal,
supra note 16, at 442-43. "[R]ecognition that violation of drunk driving laws is widespread is hardly
a reason to abolish those laws.... They may deter some from engaging in wrongful conduct, and also
may serve a valuable educational function by helping to clarify societal values." id.
27. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, at Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities.
28. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2(a) (Discussion Draft 1980) [hereinafter
Discussion Draft].
29. ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, named for the first Commission
Chairman, the late Robert J. Kutak, Esq. [hereinafter Kutak Commission].
4
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standard and the vehement reaction it engendered. 30 Hazard concludes that,
nationally, lawyers are not in consensus about fairness in negotiations. Further,
Hazard believes that there is little agreement concerning the means to enforce
fairness in the negotiation process.3p
Notwithstanding that the fairness requirement was not incorporated into the
Model Rules as adopted, 32 the current exception to the truthfulness require-
ment for negotiations, as provided by the official comment to Rule 4.1,
33
should not be allowed.
Ethics is more than a matter of external compulsion. "Ethics is a form of
critical reasoning, not a matter of indoctrination or blind obedience to external
authority, but an internal development of natural cognitive and emotional
capacities which express our moral nature in the form of principles that we
accept for ourselves and universalize for others."
34
When lawyers devise ethical standards that affect others as well as them-
selves, they must step back and examine the relevant issues and options from
an objective viewpoint. 35 What is sought to be accomplished by a standard?
What are lawyers' aspirations and highest concerns in serving the public? The
nature of the lawyer's varied roles in society raises important issues of moral
responsibility. Professor Charles Fried and others ask the question, "Can a
30. Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation to Be Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Parties,
33 S.C.L. REV. 181, 191-92 (1981). The general requirement in 4.2(a) of the Discussion Draft of the
Proposed Model Rules (1980) that lawyers be "fair" encompassed a concept of truthful representations.
Id. at 191.
The idea underlying the Kutak Commission's original proposal was not very
complicated: the lawyer, as the instrument of a transaction, should be the
guardian of its integrity .... Many members of the Commission and certainly
the Reporter were very surprised at the vehemence of the objections. "Vehe-
mence" is the correct word, since much more heat than light was forthcoming
in the reaction to the proposal.
Id. at 192.
31. Id. at 193.
32. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, at Model Rule 4.1. See supra note 8.
33. Id. at Model Rule 4.1 Comment. See supra note 8.
34. Richards, Moral Theory, the Developmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and
Professionalism, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359, 373 (1981). See also, e.g., Lowenthal, supra note 16, at 413.
"The concept of an ethic, a principal of desirable conduct that is morally binding on the conscience of
the professional, is not limited to legal duties." Id.
35. See, e.g., Elkins, Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11
(1982) (suggesting that lawyers should see themselves as strangers would:
As 'outsider' one can scrutinize what is happening, what one is being asked to
do, what is being said by others, the claims and justifications which are being
used to support an idea, concept, or theory. If we persist in this inquiry, we
ultimately confront the fundamental values which underlie our pursuit).
Id. at 45-46.
5
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lawyer be a good person?" 36 In other words, can the lawyer conform to the
traditional concept of a professional -- one devoted to his client's interests and
authorized, if not required, to do some things for the client that the lawyer
would not do for himself -- and at the same time live up to "the ideal that
one's life should be lived in fulfillment of the most demanding moral princi-
ples, and not just barely within the law."3 7 Fried answers the question affir-
matively, reasoning that, by preserving clients' autonomy and legal rights, the
lawyer acts morally. 38 The lawyer may not, however, lie or cheat for a
client.39 Fried describes lying in negotiations as an offense to both the
integrity of the victim as a rational and moral being, and to the lawyer's own
moral status.
40
Despite strong moral arguments such as Fried's and traditional prohibitions
against lawyers' engaging in deceit or misrepresentation, the ABA House of
Delegates sanctioned this behavior in negotiations by adopting Model Rule
4.141 and its accompanying Comment.42 Model Rule 4.1, as previously
mentioned, forbids lawyers while representing clients from knowingly making a
false statement of material fact to a third person and from failing "to disclose a
material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by a client," unless disclosure is prohibited by the
ABA's rule on confidentiality. 43 The Comment to Rule 4.1 states in part that
during negotiations, some statements are not to be considered statements of
"material fact," thus logically (under the rule) exempting them from the require-
ment of truthfulness and disclosure.
44
36. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
37. Id. at 1060-61.
38. Id. at 1074-75. One commentator would limit Fried's argument to legal rights that protect
important individual moral rights and fundamental political liberties but not necessarily other legal
rights: In some instances it may not be morally right to exercise the legal rights and may be wrong
for a lawyer to help him do so. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 63, 86 (1980).
39. Id. at 1083 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 1085.
Every speech act invites belief, and so every lie is a betrayal.... It is precisely
my point that a man cannot lie just in his representative capacity; it is like
stabbing someone in the back 'just' in his representative capacity. The injury
and betrayal are not worked by the legal process, but by an act which is
generally harmful quite apart from the legal context in which it occurs.
Id. In making these statements, Fried cites the following authorities: Augustine, Lying, in TREATISES
ON VARIous SuB EcTs (R. Deferrari ed. 1952), and 1. KANT, THE MErAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF
VIRTUE, 90-93 (J. Ellington trans. 1964).
41. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, at Model Rule 4.1. See supra note 8.
42. Id. at Model 4.1 Comment. See supra note 8.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id.
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1990, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1990/iss1/5
LAWYER'S VERACITY
The Comment to the rejected earlier version of Rule 4.1, as described by
Hazard, mandated that lawyers negotiating in behalf of a client "be fair in
dealing with other participants." 45 That Comment provided that, "[flairness
in negotiation implies that representations by or in behalf of one party to the
other party be truthful."4 6 Having said that, however, the Comment undercut
the fairness requirement by making the same exceptions as the adopted Com-
ment to the present Model Rule 4.147 for estimates of price, value, and settle-
ment intentions. 48 The rejected Comment, however, contained a confusing
disclaimer: "The precise contours of the legal duties concerning disclosure,
representation, puffery, overreaching, and other aspects of honesty in negotia-
tions cannot be concisely stated. They have changed over time and vary
according to circumstances. They can also vary according to the parties'
familiarity with transactions of the kind involved."
49
The rejected Comment recognized that modern commercial and securities
transactions may require disclosures by sellers that "go well beyond the classic
rule of 'caveat emptor .... , Moreover, the Comment added cryptically,
"It is a lawyer's responsibility to see that negotiations conducted by the lawyer
conform to applicable legal standards, whatever they may be."
5 1
From these statements, one can infer that the Kutak Commission expected
and countenanced at least some degree of lying or puffery, but gave little
guidance as to where the line should be drawn. These statements, 52 although
not included in the Model Rules as ultimately adopted, reveal the drafters'
thoughts. Indeed, the gist and spirit of the statements are carried into the
current Comment to Model Rule 4.1. 5 3
Even if one believes that exceptions to truthfulness are permissible for
estimates of price, value, and settlement intentions,54 is it realistic to believe
that lying in negotiations will stop with these items? Why should there be any
exceptions to truthfulness? Is negotiation merely a game?
45. Discussion Draft, supra note 28, at Rule 4.2.
46. Id. at Rule 4.2 Comment.
47. Id.
48. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, at Model Rule 4.1 Comment. See supra
note 8.
49. Discussion Draft, supra note 28, at Rule 4.2 Comment.
50. Id.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id.
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In a thoughtful commentary, Judge Alvin B. Rubin 5juestions the wisdom
of allowing "rules of the game" to govern law practice.5 He deplores equat-
ing negotiation to a game and insists that lawyers act honestly and in good
faith, so that persons dealing with them need not be as cautious as if trading in
a bazaar.5 6 An ethic, he notes, is morally binding and not just a rule of the
game.5
7
A less stringent view is espoused by Professor James White. According to
White, successful negotiators must be able to mislead like poker players, and
even the most honest and trustworthy do so.58 White discusses five cases
showing the difficultX of formulating a rule that will cover all types of lying
during negotiations. 5  In the first example, the lawyer misrepresents his true
opinion about the meaning of a case or a statute. 60 The second case involves
distortion of the value of a case or the subject matter involved. 6 1 In the third
case, a negotiator includes a series of false demands to trade for concessions
from the other side.62 In the fourth case, the plaintiff's lawyer says, "I think
$90,000 will settle this case. Will your client give $90,000?" The defense
lawyer has authority to settle for that amount, but wants to settle for less.
63
In the fifth case, the lawyer represents three persons charged with shoplifting.
Two have told him they will plead guilty and one says that he will not. The
lawyer informs the prosecutor that the two will plead guilty only if the third is
allowed to go free.
55. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 586 (1975).
To most practitioners it appears that anything sanctioned by the rules of the
game is appropriate. From this point of view, negotiations are merely, as the
social scientists have viewed it, a form of game; observance of the expected
rules, not professional ethics, is the guiding precept. But gamesmanship is not
ethics.
Id.
56. Id. at 589. Judge Rubin maintains that the legal profession is not expecting too much if its
members are required to negotiate honestly and in good faith, regardless of the other side's expertise
or sophistication. He cited the ABA oath of admission to the bar: "I will employ for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor." Id.
at 593.
57. "It is inherent in the concept of an ethic, as a principle of good conduct, that it is morally
binding on the conscience of the professional, and not merely a rule of the game adopted because other
players observe (or fail to adopt) the same rule."
Id. at 589.
58. White, supra note 23, at 927.
59. Id. at 931-35.
60. Id. at 931.
61. Id. at 932.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 932-33.
64. Id. at 933 (emphasis supplied).
8
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White found the first three cases easy. 65 In the first case, he said it is all
right in or out of court to argue an interpretation of a case or statute favorable
to a client's position even if the lawyer does not personally agree with that
interpretation. 66 White is correct as long as the law is not being falsely
represented. The Model Code67 and Model Rules 6 8 permit good faith argu-
ment for extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Such argument is
not "frivolous" even though the lawyer personally does not believe the argu-
ment will ultimately prevail.
69
In the second case, White thinks that distortion of the value of a case or
other subject matter by the lawyer is permissible even though it conflicts with
his "dispassionate analysis of the value of his case."7 0 He cited section 2-313
of the Uniform Commercial Code as permitting general statements concerning
value to be made without the law treating them as warranties.7 1 Exception
must be taken to White's conclusion, because distortion of value of the subject
of the negotiation need not rise to the level of warranty before it is improper.
It is wrong for a lawyer to lie for a client.
The third case involves what White considers a "false demand;" 7 2 a tech-
nique in multiple-issue bargaining in which one side includes a series of de-
mands about which "it cares little or not at all. The purpose of including these
demands is to increase one's supply of negotiating currency. One hopes to
convince the other party that one or more of these false demands is important
and thus successfully to trade it for some significant concession.
" 73
White believes false demands are an acceptable negotiating technique.
74
He states, "Such behavior is untruthful in the broadest sense; yet at least in
collective bargaining negotiation its use is a standard part of the process and is
not thought to be inappropriate by any experienced bargainer. ' 75 White
further states, "[a] layman might say that this behavior falls within the ambit of
'exaggeration,' a form of behavior that while not necessarily respected is not
regarded as morally reprehensible in our society."
76
Again, exception must be taken to White's conclusion because this negoti-
ating technique can become morally reprehensible and can cause great harm. In
65. Id. at 934.
66. Id.
67. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, at DR 7-102(AX2).
68. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, at Model Rule 3.1.
69. Id. at Model Rule 3.1 Comment.
70. White, supra note 23, at 932.
71. Id. (emphasis supplied).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 934.
75. Id. at 932.
76. Id. at 934.
1990]
9
Thurman: Thurman: Chipping Away at Lawyer Veracity:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
112 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 1990, No. 1
working out a divorce or separation settlement, for example, one may legiti-
mately include in a list of demands those items the client would really like to
have. One should, however, draw the line at encouraging a client to demand
custody of children purely for purposes of gaining bargaining leverage. De-
mand for custody by a parent who does not, in fact, want custody (usually
because he or she realizes that the children are better off with the other parent),
is likely to create hostility and cause the divorce proceedings to escalate into
hotly contested, expensive, and emotionally charged litigation. All this is done
in an effort to gain concessions from the other side. The considerable harm
done to the parties by this maneuver is nothing compared to the harm done to
the children.
The last two cases White finds troubling. In response to the question,
"Will your client give $90,000?",77 White reports that many, and perhaps
most, lawyers will be forced to lie or to reveal that they have been given such.
authority. He adds, "Some might say that the rules of the game provide for
such distortion, but I suspect that many lawyers would say that such lies are
out of bounds and are not part of the rules of the game."78 White correctly
concludes that a lawyer should not lie, but turn aside such questions and avoid
any inference from his silence.
As to the plea bargaining in the fifth case, White asks, "Is it conceivable
that the act can be justified on the ground that it is part of the game in this
context in that prosecutors as well as defense lawyers routinely misstate what
they, their witnesses, and clients can or will do? None of these answers seems
persuasive." 79 White is correct that it is not permissible to lie to the prosecu-
tor in negotiating the plea bargain.
White appears to countenance lying by negotiators in some of these cases
because of what he sees as limits on what the law can do. He states, "[iun a
sense rules governing these cases may simply arise from a recognition by the
law of its limited power to shape human behavior." 80 He figuratively throws
in the towel when he concedes, "[b]y tolerating exaggeration and puffing in the
sales transaction, by refusing to make misstatements of one's intentions action-
able, the law may simply have recognized the bounds of its control over human
behavior."
8 1
The error in both this suggestion, and the exception for lying in negotia-
tions provided in Rule 4.1,82 is in the notion that rules of ethics must be set
so that they accommodate the lowest possible threshold of professional behav-
ior. Lawyers should abide by high and aspirational standards of conduct.
77. Id. at 933.




82. MODEL RuL s, supra note 1, at Model Rule 4.1 Comment. See supra note 8.
10
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Lawyers' influential position in society, together with their fiduciary responsi-
bilities, demand uncompromising levels of trust, integrity, and veracity.
Countenancing puffery, exaggeration, distortion and outright lying in negotia-
tions is inconsistent with this high standard, especially in light of the indis-
pensable role of lawyers in our legal system. Lawyers ought not be compelled
to lie for clients or to compensate for the lies of opposing counsel who com-
fortably exploit the exception to veracity as set out in the Comment to Model
Rule 4.1.83
White suggests that truthfulness ought to be determined contextually by the
subject matter of the negotiation, and the region and background of the negotia-
tors,84 and type of law practice. 85 This thinking represents another out-
growth of a situational ethics framework of analysis. The difficulty of devising
standards applicable to the wide range of activities 86 embraced by negotiation
and the wide range of proficiency, skill, and sophistication among lawyers from
divergent backgrounds, contrary to White's suggestion, does not justify relaxing
requirements of integrity and veracity in negotiations.
Is White correct in his assertion that successful negotiators must be able to
mislead like poker players and that even the most honest and trustworthy do
so?87 Is misleading the same as lying? What is a lie? What is the harm in
a little lying? Webster defines a "lie" as "an assertion of something known or
believed by the speaker to be untrue with intent to deceive ... an untrue or
inaccurate statement that may or may not be believed true by the speaker ...
something that misleads or deceives."88
Philosopher Sissela Bok defines a "lie" as "an intentionally deceptive
message in the form of a statement." 89 When she began her study of lying,
Bok wrote that she looked to moral philosophers for guidance and concluded
that in addition to hurting the liar and the victim, lies harm society by lowering
83. Id.
84. White, supra note 23, at 931.
85. Id. at 929.
86. "[I]n the legal arena, negotiation includes dispute resolution, rule making, and transaction
planning, virtually all law and legal processes must be infused with negotiation processes." Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 21, at 908.
"Negotiation may concern dispute settlement, settlement of litigation, organization of an enterprise,
conclusion of a contract, labor relations, government regulatory activity, custody and support in a
family matter, and other legally significant relationships." Discussion Draft, supra note 28, at Rule 4
Introduction.
87. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
88. MERRIAM-WEBSTER NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 689 (9th Ed. 1988).
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the level of trust and social cooperation. 9° Relations among human beings
are founded on some degree of veracity, without which institutions collapse.9 '
Bok recommends a "test of publicity"9 2 which asks which lies, if any,
would reasonable persons justify. The test requires reasonable persons to look
for non-deceptive alternatives and moral reasons for and against the lie from
the perspective of those potentially deceived or affected by the lie. The test
also considers the value to society of veracity and accountability, and whether
informed consent to be deceived has been freely given (as in playing poker or
bargaining in a bazaar where each tries to outwit the other). The reasonable
persons would consider the harm to persons outside the deceptive situations,
such as distrust, loss of personal standards, and spreading of deception by
others in retaliation or limitation.
9 3
Consent, Bok observes, must be based on adequate information, ability to
make a choice, and freedom to opt out. 94 Informed consent eliminates the
discrepancy between liar and dupe. Thus, reasonable persons would probably
have no objection to buer and seller trying to outwit each other by bargaining
deceptively in a bazaar.
95
Even if Bok's test of publicity countenanced lying in a bazaar or a poker
game, the question remains whether negotiations by lawyers should be placed
on a par with bargaining in a bazaar or playing poker. Looking beyond the
liars and dupes to the harm to persons outside the situation, one can see that
lying 6 spreads and multiplies the harm and abuse, thereby increasing the dam-
age. Moreover, the absence of clear-cut standards as to what is acceptable
increases the likelihood of abuse.
97
It is easy to see that blatant deception in negotiations can produce these
harmful results. Even trivial puffery, if told with the objective of shading the
truth or in an effort to distort or mislead, undermines the integrity of the liar,
who will then find it easier to slide into more serious levels of lying and
distortion. Like pedestrians crossing the street against red lights or automobile
drivers exceeding the speed limit, law abiding citizens find themselves falling
into the same practices when they observe large numbers of persons violating
the law. If many lawyers shade the truth when they negotiate in behalf of
clients, the practice will spread by imitation or retaliation and will spill over
into more serious distortions. The ultimate outcome is loss of trust and
goodwill toward lawyers and the law. Bar association public relations cam-
90. Id. at xix and Chapter 2.
91. Id. at 31.
92. Id. at 100.
93. Id. at Chapter 7.
94. Id. at 103-04.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 104.
97. Id.
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paigns may be able to dispel myths about lawyers, but not matters for which
there is a factual basis.
To avoid this insidious cycle, lawyers engaged in negotiations should make
it a practice to weigh their statements before speaking and ask themselves: Is
this statement true? Is it necessary? Do I have an alternative? May I say
nothing or tell the truth? Like the social white lie, told usually out of good
intentions to be polite or save someone's feelings, puffery, exaggeration, or
simple misstatements in negotiations can become ingrained and habitual. At
that point, duplicity becomes a way of life. These types of deception can be
reduced by consciously looking for alternatives, even without clear-cut stan-
dards as to what is acceptable.
Bok is correct that some forms of dishonesty might be tolerable in some
settings such as the bazaar and poker examples, 98 but the lawyer engaged in
negotiations is not in such a setting. The new Model Rule 4.199 redefines the
negotiation setting in such a way as to demean and diminish the lawyers' role
and ethics.
Model Rule 4.1100 is also inconsistent with the precept set out in the
Preamble to the Model Rules: "As negotiator a lawyer seeks results advanta-
geous to the client but consistent with the requirements of honest dealings with
others."10 1 If "advantageous results ... consistent with honest dealings with
others" 1° 2 were observed as the acceptable level of negotiations by the pro-
fession, sharp practices would not be countenanced and those who engaged in
them would be ostracized and disciplined. As a consequence, lawyers and their
clients could realistically evaluate the subject matter of the negotiations and
plan accordingly.
III. CONCLUSION
Maintaining moral sensitivity and awareness is crucial to the practice of
law. The profession must resist inroads on the lawyer's commitment to truth,
and take steps to correct rules that lessen this commitment. The unique role
lawyers occupy in our society and their position as officers of our judicial
system require that their word be trusted. More is required of a lawyer than
the custom of the marketplace, than bargaining in a bazaar, or in playing poker.
98. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
99. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, at Model Rule 4.1 and Comment. See supra note 8.
100. Id.
101. Id. at Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibility. (emphasis supplied)
102. Id. This rule is also inconsistent with the proscription against dishonesty, deception and
misrepresentation. Id. at Model Rule 8.4(c).
1990]
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Lawyers must feel that theirs is a worthy role and honorable profession.
1 °3
Self-acceptance is vital to a lawyer's well-being and profoundly affects profes-
sional relationships and practices.
10 4
Lying in negotiations should not be countenanced, much less expressly
authorized. Before this unprecedented diminution of legal ethics takes hold, its
advocates should bear the burden of establishing that negotiation cannot occur
without an element of dishonesty. Since no one has apparently made a persua-
sive argument that lawyer negotiators cannot operate on a high plane, the
presumption of honest behavior should remain, 1° 5 and the exception to the
requirement of truthfulness for lawyers engaged in negotiations, created by
Model Rule 4.1 and its Comment, h06 should be repealed.
103. In his autobiography, Mahatma Gandhi wrote:
I realized that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder.
The lesson was so indelibly burnt into me that a large part of my time during
the twenty years of practice as a lawyer was occupied in bringing about private
compromises of hundreds of cases. I lost nothing thereby -- not even money,
certainly not my soul.
M. GANDm, ALL MEN ARE BROTHERS 18 (1958).
104. See, e.g., Elkins, supra note 35, at 50:
The fact is ... that virtually every lawyer wants to feel that he is not only a
good lawyer (in the sense of technical proficiency) but that he is a lawyer of
impeccable integrity. He not only wishes this to be his public image, he wishes
to think this of himself. Self-acceptance is a very important element--perhaps
the most important element--of a wholesome, serviceable personality.
(quoting J. PIKE, BEYOND THE LAW, THE RELIGIOUS AND ETHIcAL MEANING OF THE LAWYER'S
VOCATION 91 (1963)).
105. "Trust and integrity are precious resources, easily squandered, hard to regain. They can
thrive only on a foundation of respect for veracity." Bok, supra note 53, at 249.
106. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, at Model Rule 4.1 and Comment. See supra note 8.
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